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LIBRARIES: Sex Offender Exclusion Zones. Iowa Code § 692A.113. Iowa Code 
section 692A.113(1)(f) prohibits sex offenders who have been convicted of a sex 
offense involving a minor child from being present on the real property of a public 
library without the written permission of the library administrator. A library 
administrator should exercise such discretion through a deliberation of competing 
considerations although such decision making could be exercised in broad 
categories. (Oetker to Wolf, Clinton County Attorney, 7-8-11) #11-7-1 
Mr. Michael Wolf 
Clinton County Attorney 
P.O. Box 2957 
612 North Second Street- 2nd Floor 
Clinton, Iowa 52733-2957 
Dear Mr. Wolf: 
July 8, 2011 
You have requested an opinion from this office regarding application of the 
sex offender exclusion zones codified in Iowa Code section 692A.l13 to the real 
property of a public library. In relevant part, section 692A.113 excludes sex 
offenders who have been convicted of a sex offense against a minor from the real 
property of a public library without the permission of the library administrator. 
You ask whether a library administrator may adopt a blanket policy refusing to 
grant such written permission under any and all circumstances or whether a library 
administrator is required to exercise such decision-making authority on a case-by-
case basis. 
To place this issue within the proper context, it is perhaps beneficial to 
examine the history of Iowa's residency restrictions and exclusionary zones made 
applicable to sex offenders. In early 2002, the Iowa legislature enacted certain sex 
offender residency restrictions, which became effective on July 1, 2002. 2002 
Iowa Acts ch. 1157. See also Michael J. Duster, Note, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: 
State Attempts to Banish Sex Offenders, 53 Drake L. Rev. 711, 720-21 (2005) 
(discussing progression of Iowa's sex offender residency restriction legislation). 
The legislation was made applicable to all persons who have "committed a 
criminal offense against a minor, or an aggravated offense, sexually violent 
offense, or other relevant offense that involved a minor" and precluded such 
persons from residing "within two thousand feet of the real property comprising a 
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public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school or a child care facility." Iowa 
Code§§ 692A.2A(1) & (2) (2003). 
Following the State's adoption of the sex offender residency restrictions, 
Iowa cities sought to impose their own residency restrictions under their broad 
home rule powers. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A (providing that "[m]unicipal 
corporations are granted home rule power and authority, not inconsistent with the 
laws of the General Assembly"); Iowa Code § 364.1 (providing that a "city may, 
except as expressly limited by the Constitution of the State of Iowa, and if not 
inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly, exercise any power and 
perform any function it deems appropriate to protect and preserve the rights, 
privileges, and property of the city or of its residents, and to preserve and improve 
the peace, safety, health, welfare, comfort, and convenience of its residents"). As 
this office observed in responding to the question of whether a city could expand 
the residency restrictions beyond the real property identified within the state 
statute, "[i]n light of the high recidivism threat posed by sex offenders and the 
desire to protect children from this risk, some small towns have enacted residency 
restrictions" to other locations, including public parks, libraries, and campgrounds. 
Iowa Att'y Gen. Op. #08-9-2, 2008 WL 6690123, at *5. This office opined not 
only that a "city's home rule authority to exercise police power encompasses the 
imposition of residency restrictions upon convicted sex offenders," but also, that a 
court would likely reject the contention that the State's residency restriction statute 
either expressly or implicitly preempted local legislation on the subject. Id. at * 3, 
4. See !U1., Formaro v. Polk County, 773 N.W.2d 834, 844 (Iowa 2009) (noting 
that cities and counties had begun adopting ordinances further restricting the 
residency zones for sex offenders). 
As local communities began adopting their own ordinances, rules, and 
regulations expanding the restrictions beyond the real property identified within 
the state statute, the area of the state in which sex offenders could reside 
diminished. In Formaro, the Court observed that evidence presented tended to 
substantiate the offender's claim "that almost ninety percent of the state falls 
within the exclusion zones .... " Id. 
"During the 2009 legislative session, the Iowa General Assembly enacted a 
comprehensive revision of the sex offender ... laws in Chapter 692A." State v. 
Adams, No. 09-1499, 2010 WL 3894440, at *I n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2010) 
(citing 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 119). The legislature repealed Iowa's prior statutes 
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governing the registry and residency of sex offenders, see 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 119, 
§ 31, and enacted new registry and residency restrictions. Iowa Code §§ 692A.1 01 
through 692A.l30. Additionally, the legislature added sex offender exclusionary 
zones and prohibitions on certain employment-related activities. Id. at 
§ 692A.113. Finally, the legislature expressly preempted local action on the 
subject matter through section 692A.127, which provides: 
[a] political subdivision of the state shall not adopt any motion, 
resolution, or ordinance regulating the residency location of a sex 
offender or any motion, resolution, or ordinance regulating the 
exclusion of a sex offender from certain real property. A motion, 
resolution, or ordinance adopted by a political subdivision of the 
state in violation of this section is void and unenforceable and any 
enforcement activity conducted in violation of this section is void. 
Your question focuses squarely on the statutory exclusionary zones, which 
provide: 
A sex offender who has been convicted of a sex offense against a 
minor or a person required to register as a sex offender in another 
jurisdiction for an offense involving a minor shall not do any of the 
following: 
a. Be present upon the real property of a public or nonpublic 
elementary or secondary school without the written permission of the 
school administrator or school administrator's designee, unless 
enrolled as a student at the school. 
b. Loiter within three hundred feet of the real property boundary 
of a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school, unless 
enrolled as a student at the school. 
c. Be present on or in any vehicle or other conveyance owned, 
leased, or contracted by a public or nonpublic elementary or 
secondary school without the written permission of the school 
administrator or school administrator's designee when the vehicle is 
in use to transport students to or from a school or school-related 
activities, unless enrolled as a student at the school or unless the 
Mr. Michael Wolf 
Clinton County Attorney 
Page4 
vehicle is simultaneously made available to the public as a form of 
public transportation. 
d. Be present upon the real property of a child care facility 
without the written permission of the child care facility 
administrator. 
e. Loiter within three hundred feet of the real property boundary 
of a child care facility. 
f Be present upon the real property of a public library1 without 
the written permission of the library administrator. 
g. Loiter within three hundred feet of the real property boundary 
of a public library. 
h. Loiter on or within three hundred feet of the premises of any 
place intended primarily for the use of minors including but not 
limited to a playground available to the public, a children's play area 
available to the public, a recreational or sport-related activity area 
when in use by a minor, a swimming or wading pool available to the 
public when in use by a minor, or a beach available to the public 
when in use by a minor. 
Iowa Code§ 692A.ll3(1) (emphasis added). A sex offender who violates these 
provisions commits an aggravated misdemeanor for the first offense and a class 
"D" felony for each subsequent offense. I d. at § 692A.lll (1 ). Additionally, a sex 
offender convicted of an aggravated offense against a minor, a sex offense against 
a minor, or a sexually violent offense while in violation of section 692A.l13 is 
guilty of a class "C" felony in addition to any other penalty provided by law. I d. 
Section 692A.l13(1)(f) prohibits a sex offender convicted of a sex offense 
against a minor from being present on the real property of a public library unless 
' A "public library" is defined to mean "any library that receives financial support from a 
city or county pursuant to section 256.69." Iowa Code§ 692A.101(22) (Supp. 2009). 
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the library administrator provides written permission.2 The legislature clearly 
delegated the discretion to the library administrator to make admission 
determinations but failed to specify when a library administrator may affirmatively 
adopt a blanket policy that applicable sex offenders will never be admitted or 
whether a library administrator is obligated to exercise such discretion on a case-
by-case basis. 
In 1976 Iowa Op. Att'y Gen. 767, this office examined a statute that vested 
county sheriffs with the discretion to issue a permit to carry a concealed weapon. 
In discussing what constitutes a valid exercise of that discretion, this office noted: 
"Discretion may be defined, when applied to public functionaries, as 
the power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially 
under certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own 
judgment and conscience, and not controlled by judgment or 
conscience of others." 
This concept of judgment or discretion implies an "acting" or 
decision making process between competing consideration. It also 
connotes a process that is reasonable and unarbitrary, and is not 
exercised merely by denying or granting the request of a party. 
I d. at 768 (emphasis in original). In further analyzing whether the exercise of 
discretion requires an "act" or decision-making process, this office further stated: 
If for example, a sheriff would categorically refuse or deny the 
issuance of any permits whatsoever, the discretionary or decision-
making power vested in him by the legislature would be rendered a 
nullity and the responsibility conferred under the language of the 
statute to render a judgment would be abrogated. This a sheriff 
cannot do. The legislature has not said that no person may carry a 
Sections 692A.ll3(2)(b) and (c) do allow applicable sex offenders to be present on the real 
property of a library "during the period of time reasonably necessary to transport the 
offender's own minor child or ward" to and from a public library and "for the period of time 
reasonably necessary to exercise the right to vote in a public election if the polling location 
of the offender is located" in a public library. 
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concealed weapon, but rather citizens may be so armed if the sheriff 
in his judgment finds it to be warranted .... 
We believe that the discretionary or judgment exercise of a sheriff 
cannot be accomplished by any hard and fast rule and that judgment 
on the circumstances must be exercised on each and every 
application. 
!d. (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). See Iowa Op. Att'y Gen. 
#01-10-1 (2001 WL 1651437) (reaffirming principle that when the legislature 
vests discretion in a governmental actor, the govemmental actor may not 
categorically refuse to exercise the decision-making authority as to do so would 
render the legislative delegation a nullity). 
This principle finds further support from Iowa adjudicatory law. In IBP, 
Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 630 (Iowa 2000), for example, the Iowa 
Supreme Court reviewed the exercise of discretion in the context of admission of 
evidence during a workers compensation contested case hearing. Id. As relevant 
to this issue, the agency possessed a blanket policy excluding all psychologists' 
testimony in contested case hearings on the issue of causation between a work 
injury and a mental condition on the basis that psychologists are not physicians 
under Iowa law. ld. In reversing, the Court found that while the agency possessed 
the discretion to admit or not admit specific testimony, the agency's blanket 
exclusion of all such evidence did not constitute proper exercise of such discretion. 
ld. at 631. The Al-Gharib Court, like the prior opinion of this office discussed 
above, concluded that discretion requires a decision-making process between 
competing considerations. The creation of a blanket policy does not encompass 
the weighing of considerations under the circumstances presented to constitute the 
valid exercise of discretion. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the Iowa legislature differentiated between 
sex offender exclusions over which a library administrator possesses discretion and 
those over which a library administrator possesses no discretion. While section 
692A.113(1)(t) states that a library administrator may provide written approval for 
a relevant sex offender to be present on the real property of a library, section 
692A.113(l)(g) omits any such approval language that would allow a sex offender 
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to "[l]oiter3 within three hundred feet of the real property boundary of a public 
library." See Greenwood Manor v. Iowa Dep't of Public Health, 641 N.W.2d 823, 
835 (Iowa 2002) (holding the legislature's use of different language in separate 
sections reflects a deliberate differentiating between the two situations). 
In light of the aforementioned reasoning, we believe that because the 
legislature vested library administrators with the authority to provide a sex 
offender written permission to enter on the real property of a public library, library 
administrators must exercise such decision-making power. Furthermore, we do 
not believe that a library administrator's blanket exclusion of ail such sex 
offenders in ail circumstances constitutes a valid exercise of this decision-making 
power. Rather, we believe a library administrator should exercise such discretion 
through deliberation of the competing considerations. See U, Kreimer v. Bureau 
of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1255 (3'd Cir. 1992) 
(recognizing that First Amendment jurisprudence "includes the right to some level 
of access to a public library, the quintessential locus of the receipt of information") 
(emphasis added). 
We do not wish to imply, however, that a library administrator could not 
exercise such discretion in broad categories. See £,.&, Lenning v. Iowa Dep't of 
Trans., 368 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Iowa 1985) (holding that delegated decision-making 
discretion does not necessarily require an agency to exercise independent 
discretion in each individual case where such discretion could be exercised in other 
manners, such as through rule making). For example, a library administrator may 
wish to broadly consider and treat admission requests to attend a governmental 
body's public meeting under Iowa Code chapter 21 differently than admission 
requests that lack any identifiable purpose or that seek unfettered access to the 
internet through a public library's computer terminals. Furthermore, even in those 
situations in which permission to enter is granted, a library administrator could 
impose reasonable conditions on the individual's presence (e.g., to only certain 
areas of the public library, to only certain times during the day), the violation of 
which could give rise to permission revocation. See £,.&, Neinast v. Board of 
For purposes of Chapter 692A, "loiter" is defined to mean "remaining in a place or 
circulating around a place under circmnstances that would warrant a reasonable person to 
believe that the purpose or effect of the behavior is to enable a sex offender to become 
familiar with a location where a potential victim may be found, or to satisfy an unlawful 
sexual desire, or to locate, lure, or harass a potential victim." 
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Trustees of the Columbus Metropolitan Library, 346 F.3d 585, 591-95 (6'h Cir. 
2003) (finding library policy that excluded entry to individuals not wearing shoes 
survived First Amendment scrutiny because library policy furthered legitimate 
governmental interest of protecting public health and safety). Alternatively, a 
library administrator may wish to adopt policies that would allow access to 
information and material contained within the public library while limiting or even 
eliminating the offender's physical presence in the public library. 
In sum, section 692A.113(l)(f) vests library administrators with the 
discretion to allow sex offenders on the real property of a public library. It is our 
opinion that such discretion should be exercised through a decision-making 
process under which the competing interests are considered. Additionally, we 
would recommend library administrators create policies that detail any broad 
category determinations as well as outlining the application and review process. 
Naturally, a library may wish to utilize the application process to acquire sufficient 
information from which the library administrator may make an informed decision. 
Matthew T. Oetker 
Assistant Attorney General 
